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INTRODUCTION
The September l1th Victim Compensation Fund (the Fund) was
created in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Much
has been written about the Fund, both pro and con, in both popular media' and scholarly literature. 2 Perhaps the most widely used term in referring to the Fund is "unprecedented."' 3 The Fund is intriguing for many
reasons, particularly for its public policy implications and its impact on
the claimants themselves.
The federal government has never before provided compensation to
victims of terrorism through a special master who had virtually unlimited
discretion in determining awards. Consequently, this formal allocation
of money by a representative of the federal government to its citizens has
provided an opportunity to test theories of procedural and distributive
justice in a novel context. This article tests these theories by analyzing
the results of a study of the Fund's claimants. Part I provides general
background, summarizes existing commentary on the Fund, and discusses prior research on social justice that is relevant to the 9/11 claimants' experiences with the Fund. Part II of this article describes the
methodology behind the study, in which seventy-one individuals who
filed claims with the Fund completed surveys about their experiences
with and perceptions of the Fund. Part III discusses the survey results.
We found that participants were reasonably satisfied with the procedural
1 E.g., Lisa Belkin, JustMoney, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 8, 2002, at 92; Anthony J.
Sebok, The Special Master'sReport on the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund: Is He
Right that Victims' Families' Awards Should Have Been Equal?, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Dec. 13,
2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20041213.html.
2 E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral
Sources under the September lth Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 591
(2003); R. M. Ackerman, The September lth Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 135 (2005); Janet C.
Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627
(2003); Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searchingfor Justice through Compensation for
PersonalInjury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 417 (2003); Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of
Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53
EMORY L.J. 1315 (2004); Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Terrorism: What We Are
Learning, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 805 (2003).
3 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 137; Michele L. Dauber, The War of 1812,
September 11 th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAuL L. REv. 289, 289 (2003); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE
THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005) [hereinafter WHAT Is LIFE WORTH]; Lawrence M. Friedman &
Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-made Tragedy, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 251, 286 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological
Perspective on Compensationfor Harm: Examining the September I Ith Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 355, 358 (2003).
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aspects of the Fund, such as representatives' impartiality and respectful
treatment. Participants were less satisfied, however, with the distributive
aspects of the Fund, such as the unequal distribution of compensation
and the reduction in compensation if claimants received compensation
from other sources (e.g., life insurance). Part IV of this article addresses
the implications of the study results for public policy and for theories of
social justice.
I.

THE CREATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND

On September 22, 2001, Congress passed and the President signed
4
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA).
The main purpose of ATSSSA was to stabilize and protect the airlines
with federal loan guarantees and compensation for losses after air travel
was halted on 9/11, while also capping the airlines' liability and imposing jurisdictional constraints on litigation. 5 ATSSSA also established the
September 1 lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund) in order
to discourage lawsuits against the airlines and to provide victims and
their families with an alternative to redress through the court system.
Victims injured in the September 11th attacks and the families of those
killed could make a claim for compensation from the government in exchange for waiving their right to sue potential domestic defendants, such
as the airlines and airplane manufacturers. 6 There was no congressional
appropriation for the Fund and no limit on the amount of money that
could be paid out. The Fund closed to claimants in December 2003 and
completed its distribution of payments in June 2004. In the end, 97% of
those eligible to make a claim to the Fund participated and the Fund
distributed approximately $7 billion to the claimants. 7 Of this amount,
8
$5.99 billion went to the 2,880 death claimants and their families.
4 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2001).
5 See Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining
the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
1, 1-41 (2006); LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL K. STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/
11 ATTACKS 18-19 (RAND Corp. 2004), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2004/RANDMG264.pdf.
6 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). See generally Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A CircumscribedResponse or an Auspicious Model? 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003).
7 Ackerman, supra note 2, at 180-81; KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., 1 FINAL REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 1 ITh VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at
77, 80 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
8 FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 52.
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BACKGROUND ON THE FUND

Shortly after passage of ATSSSA, Attorney General John Ashcroft
appointed Kenneth Feinberg as Special Master to administer the Fund. 9
The statute required that the Special Master set compensation according
to "the extent of harm to the claimant, including any economic and noneconomic losses." 10 Economic loss was defined in the statute as it is
generally understood in tort law and included loss of earnings, benefits,
replacement services, etc."I Non-economic loss was defined to include
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society, etc. 12 For those claiming compensation on
behalf of a deceased victim, Feinberg developed a formula for calculating each claimant's "presumed economic loss" based on a variety of factors including the victim's age, income, benefits, and remaining years of
workforce participation. 13 Claimants were presented with this determi-

nation and had the opportunity to appeal to the Special Master for an
adjustment based on individual circumstances.
For non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering and hedonic
damages, every eligible claimant and dependent of the victim received
the same amount of compensation. As Feinberg stated, "I refused to exercise Solomonic judgment in calibrating individual degrees of pain and
suffering and emotional distress."' 14 For death claims, Feinberg set noneconomic damages at $250,000 per victim and $100,000 per spouse and
each dependent child. 15 In addition, Feinberg guaranteed that no one
would receive less than $250,000 in total compensation. 16 For high-income earners, such as investment bankers who worked in the World
Trade Center, Feinberg deviated from the economic loss model by not
considering annual incomes above $231,000 for the presumed economic
loss calculation. 17 Without this limit on presumed awards, there would
have been many more claimants who would have recovered well in ex9 WHAT Is LnFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 24-25. Mr. Feinberg has recently been appointed to oversee the distribution of money donated to Virginia Tech University in the wake
of the April 16, 2007 shootings. Ian Urbina, Sept. 11 Compensation Chief to Oversee Virginia
Tech Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at A10.
10 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(1)(B)(i), 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2001).
11 Id. § 402(5).
12 Id. § 402(7).
13 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5, at 22-23; FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 30-39.
14 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 35.
15 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5; WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 39, 77 (indicating the amount for surviving spouses and dependents was initially set at $50,000 but was later
raised to $100,000).
16 WHAT Is LnE WORTH, supra note 3, at 51.
17 Id. at 73.
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cess of $5 million based only on the victim's projected income.18 As
Feinberg stated, "I was convinced that I should use my discretion to narrow the gap between high-end and low-end awards."' 9
Once the amount of compensation was determined, the statute required that it be reduced by other payments that the claimant received,
20
including proceeds from life insurance and workers compensation.
These offsets are typical of other government compensation programs,
such as state-run crime victim compensation programs. 2 1 These programs reduce compensation by collateral payments through insurance
and social security and typically do not provide compensation for pain
and suffering. 22 Feinberg again exercised his discretion and did not deduct charity received by the families, despite language in the statute that
could be interpreted to require such deduction. 23 The statute made the
decisions of the Special Master final and not subject to appeal. 24 The
compensation awarded by the Fund for death claimants ranged from
$250,000 to $7.1 million.2 5 The average award was $2.08 million and
the median was $1.7 million. 26 Feinberg claimed that the closeness of
the mean and the median indicated that he was successful at reducing
27
disparities and preventing excessively high or low awards.
Thus, the Fund was a complex hybrid of different approaches to
compensation. 28 As in a typical wrongful death tort case, economic loss
29
was measured according to the projected future earnings of the victim.
Yet, unlike the typical tort case, and more like workers compensation
18 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5, at 22-23; WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at
73-74.
19 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 47.
20 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(6), 49 U.S.C.
40101(2001); see, e.g., DIXON & STERN, supra note 5, at 23. This requirement is usually
referred to as the "collateral source offset" rule.
21 LISA C. NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF STATE VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: TRENDS AND STRATEGIES

FOR THE FUTURE 105 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410924_VOCA
_Full Report.pdf.
22 Id. at 15.
23 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 402(4); WHAT Is LIFE
WORTH, supra note 3, at 70-71.
24 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(6)(3).
25 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 202.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 156-57.
28 See generally Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (2003); Stephan Landsman, A Chance to Be Heard:
Thoughts about Schedules, Caps, and Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2003); George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September lth Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527
(2003); Anthony J. Sebok, What's Law Got to Do with It? Designing Compensation Schemes
in the Shadow of the Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501 (2003).
29 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5, at 21-23.
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systems and no-fault auto insurance, the claimant was not required to
prove liability on the part of any defendant. 30 Unlike both tort damages
(which usually includes non-economic damages based on the extent of
psychic harm) and workers compensation (which typically does not permit non-economic damages), non-economic damages for death claimants
to the Fund were uniform, regardless of the individual circumstances of
the victims or claimants. 3' Finally, in the typical personal injury or
wrongful death case, insurance and other collateral sources of compensation are not deducted from the award, as they were under the collateral
offset provision of ATSSSA.

B.

EXISTING COMMENTARY ON THE FUND

There were many controversial aspects of the Fund. For example,
some claimants objected to the collateral offset rule that was written into
the enabling statute. 32 Others complained that it was unfair to make noneconomic damages uniform when some victims suffered more than
others before they died, and some family members claimed special emotional needs. 33 Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Fund was
that it awarded compensation to the families of victims on the basis of
each victim's earning power before death. Distributing funds in this
manner was perceived by many to be unjust. 3 4 Even Mr. Feinberg, despite his confidence in the Fund's due process and its "stunning success, ' 35 stated that future compensation funds should not be based on the
36
economic loss model.
Much has been written, particularly in the legal academic literature,
about the procedural and distributive justice aspects of the Fund and its
larger implications for tort law. 37 There has also been some empirical
research on the claimants, 38 but it is primarily anecdotal and unsystematic. There are also some data available about the mental health is39
sues that victims and their families have faced.
30 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(2), 49 U.S.C. 40101
(2001). See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 636-39.
31 James R. Copland, Tragic Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, Historical
Antecedents, and Lessons for Tort Reform 20 (Manhattan Institute, Center for Legal Policy
Working Paper, 2005), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/clpwp_01-13-05.
pdf; Rabin, supra note 6, at 783-87.
32 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5, at 24; Landsman, supra note 28, at 413.
33 Belkin, supra note 1, at 97.
34 Id. at 96; Hensler, supra note 2, at 436-38.
35 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 163.
36 Id., at 177-88.
37 See generally Abraham & Logue, supra note 2; Ackerman, supra note 2; Alexander,
supra note 2; Hensler, supra note 2; Mullenix, supra note 2; Shapo, supra note 2.
38 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5; Hensler, supra note 2.
39 SUSAN W. COATES ET AL., SEPTEMBER 11: TRAUMA AND HUMAN BONDS (2003).
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THE FUND AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIAL JUSTICE

It is widely accepted that people are concerned about the fairness of
both decision-making processes (i.e., procedural justice) and outcomes
(i.e., distributive justice). 40 Tom Tyler has shown that to a large extent,
different factors influence perceptions of distributive and procedural fairness. 4 1 Resource concerns (e.g., "Am I getting as much as I deserve,"
"Am I getting a fair amount relative to others") are most closely related
to distributive justice, while relational concerns (e.g., "Are the authorities
trustworthy," "Are the authorities neutral," "What is my standing in the
42
group") are most closely related to procedural justice.
1.

Distributive Justice

In general, people have complex, pluralistic views on distributing
resources, relying on several distinct allocation principles, which are
often invoked simultaneously. 43 For example, Mitchell and colleagues
found that participants employed principles of both equality and efficiency and made tradeoffs between them in evaluating income distributions. 44 Michelbach and colleagues likewise found that most individuals'
distribution preferences are fluid and reflect trade-offs among principles. 45 Thus, the experimental research suggests that individuals' distributive justice preferences are pluralistic and complex, varying both across
individuals and across situations.
Experimental research on distributive justice indicates that a variety
of factors can influence perceptions of outcome fairness. Distributive
justice varies depending on what good is being distributed and the con40 See generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural
Justice (Springer-Verlag New York, LLC 1988); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the
Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and ProceduralJustice, 67 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH.
850 (1994) [hereinafter PsychologicalModels].
41 E.g., Psychological Models, supra note 40, at 855.
42 Id.; see also Melvin J. Lerner, The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses on Its Origins
and Forms, 45 J. PEaRS. 1, 1-2 (1977); Lind & Tyler, supra note 40, at 61-127; Tom R. Tyler
& E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (Mark Zanna ed., 1992).
43 See, e.g., Jon Elster, The Empirical Study of Justice, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND
EQUALITY 81, 85-88 (David Miller & Michael Walzer eds., 1995); NORMAN FROHtLICH & JOE
A.

OPPENHEIMER,

CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY

(1993); DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2001);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (Basic
Books 1983); Philip A. Michelbach et al., Doing Rawls Justice: An Experimental Study of
Income DistributionNorms, 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 523, 523, 534-35 (2003); Gregory Mitchell et
al., Judgments of Social Justice: Compromises between Equality and Efficiency, 65 J. PERS. &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 629, 633-35 (1993); John T. Scott et al., Just Deserts: An Experimental Study
of Distributive Justice Norms, 45 AM J. POL. SCI. 749, 764 (2001).
44 Mitchell et al., supra note 43, at 633-36.
45 Michelbach et al., supra note 43, at 529-35; see also Scott et al., supra note 43, at
762-63.
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text of the distribution (e.g., the scarcity of resources and the extent to
which actors' efforts influence outcomes), as well as the individuals' particular characteristics, such as gender, culture, ideology, and socio-economic status. 4 6 For example, women tend to be more egalitarian than
men 47 and in comparison to whites, members of minority groups are less
sensitive to differences in merit. 48 In addition, people tend to evaluate
distributive outcomes in both relative and absolute terms. That is, one's
outcome relative to those similarly situated is an important determinant
49
of perceived fairness, as is one's outcome in some absolute sense.
2.

ProceduralJustice

A multitude of factors influence perceptions of procedural fairness.
Relational concerns, as manifested by polite or respectful treatment at the
hands of authorities, significantly predict individuals' satisfaction with
encounters with authorities. 50 In addition to the relational concerns identified by Lind and Tyler, 5 1 procedural fairness is enhanced by giving
disputants an opportunity to voice their side of the story. 52 Thus, decision-makers can use a variety of measures to enhance a disputant's sense
of procedural justice. Resulting improvements in perceptions of procedural justice have been demonstrated in a variety of contexts, including
organizational settings, citizens' encounters with the police and other legal authorities, treatment by the government and health care plans, and
46 See, e.g., Michelbach et al., supra note 43, at 536-37 (discussing race and gender
differences in "distributive justice behavior"); Scott et. al., supra note 43, at 763-64 (discussing gender differences in "distributive justice judgments"); Linda J. Skitka & Philip E.
Tetlock, Allocating Scarce Resources: A Contingency Model of DistributiveJustice, 28 J. ExPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 515, 519 (1992) (discussing differences in distributive justice judgments as a function of political ideology).
47 Michelbach et al., supra note 43, at 536-37; see Scott et al., supra note 43, at 763-64.
48 See Michelbach et al., supra note 43, at 529-30.
49 MILLER, supra note 43; Jason Sunshine & Larry Heuer, Deservingness and Perceptions of ProceduralJustice in Citizen Encounters with the Police, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 397 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
50 See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations
of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Soc'Y. REV. 951, 964-73 (1990);
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J.
PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond Formal
Procedures: The InterpersonalContext of ProceduralJustice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL-

OGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SE-rINGS 77 (John S. Carroll ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. Inc.
1990).
51 Lind & Tyler, supra note 40, 61-127; see also Tyler & Lind, supra note 42.
52 See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence
on ProceduralFairnessJudgments, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 676 (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAU-

Wiley & Sons Inc.
1976); Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72 (1985).
RENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (John
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involvement in the court system. 53 Feinberg believed that claimants
would only be satisfied with the Fund if it provided extensive due process, particularly the opportunity to be heard. He stated that he "was
54
determined to make due process a cardinal virtue of the program."

Feinberg adopted a number of procedures designed to increase the transparency of the process and provide claimants with a voice in the proceedings, such as meeting with individual families, posting information on
the Fund's website, and simplifying claim forms. 55 Individuals' perceptions of authorities' legitimacy and their expectations or sense of entitle56
ment about how they should be treated are also key matters.
Presumably, all Fund claimants would feel entitled to respectful treatment, yet there was doubtless variability amongst individuals as to what
57
constituted respectful treatment.
As with distributive justice, there are important racial/ethnic differences in attitudes toward procedural justice, especially when the authorities involved are the police or other governmental agents. Compared to
whites, minority citizens are more likely to feel that they are treated less
53 Bies & Shapiro, supra note 52, 682-84; Psychological Models, supra note 40, at
855-57; Tyler & Bies, supra note 50, at 83-88, 89-91 (focusing on organizational settings);
Sunshine & Heuer, supra note 49, at 409-12; Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Supportfor Policing, 37 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 513, 522-34 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 329-40 (2003) [hereinafter ProceduralJustice]; Tom R.
Tyler, Racial Profiling, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social Authority, in
SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING, 61, 65-69 (Richard L. Wiener et al.
eds., 2007) (police encounters); PsychologicalModels, supra note 40, at 854-55 (encounters
with other legal authorities); Larry Heuer et al., The Role of Resource and Relational Concerns
for ProceduralJustice, 28 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1468, 1471-77 (2002) (treatment by
the government); Virginia Murphy-Berman et al., Fairnessand Health Care Decision Making:
Testing the Group Value Model of ProceduralJustice, 12 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 123-25 (1999)
(treatment by healthcare plans); Lind et al., supra note 50, 967-73, 981; Psychological Models, supra note 40, at 854-55; Tristin Wayte et al., Psychological Issues in Civil Law, in
TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 323, 330-36 (James R.P.
Ogloff ed., 2002) (involvement in the court system).
54 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 44.
55 Id. at 49.
56 Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 53, at 534-36 (showing perceptions of legitimacy impact the willingness of individuals to cooperate with police); Larry Heuer et al., A Deservingness Approach to Respect as a Relationally Based Fairness Judgment, 25 PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1279, 1282-89 (1999) (citing study results showing an individual's sense of
deservingness and self-esteem impact his or her perception of fair treatment); Melvin J. Lerner, Integrating Societal and Psychological Rules of Entitlement: The Basic Task of Each
Social Actor and Fundamental Problem for the Social Sciences, I Soc. JUST. RES. 107,
115-17, 120-22 (1987) (impact of individual's sense of entitlement on his or her behavior);
Sunshine & Heuer, supra note 49, at 397, 403-08 (showing inverse relationship between entitlement and perceived fairness of treatment, but positive correlation between favorable treatment and perceived fairness).
57 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 51-61 (describing the variety of reactions
among families of victims).
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fairly by the police and the courts.5 8 Despite this difference in perceived
fairness across racial groups, the same factors (e.g., legitimacy, voice,
etc.) appear to influence the perception of procedural justice in white and
59
minority samples.
3.

InteractionBetween Distributive and ProceduralJustice

Although distributive and procedural justice are often construed independently, they are interrelated. 60 Different factors do tend to influence perceptions of distributive and procedural fairness, but there is not a
perfectly clean separation between them. 6 1 For example, relational variables, such as trust, neutrality, and standing, affect judgments about resource distribution as well as procedural justice. 62 Consequently, there is
a correlation between measures of procedural and distributive justice, as
well as between measures of justice and outcome. 63 In the context of the
Fund, the existence of factors common to procedural and distributive justice creates an expectation of correlations between outcome (i.e., the
amount of compensation), distributive justice, and procedural justice for
Fund beneficiaries.
D.

THE NEED TO STUDY FUND CLAIMANTS

Theories of social justice are more robust when consistent findings
emerge in diverse contexts, especially in extreme, novel instances, such
as the September 1 Ith Victim Compensation Fund. The circumstances
surrounding the Fund differ in several respects from the legal and organizational contexts of many distributive and procedural justice studies.
Claimants to the Fund became eligible because of a completely unexpected and unique event, in contrast to studies involving events about
which participants may have formed preconceived notions, such as dispute-resolution proceedings and employment. 64 The Fund differs in the
nature of the authority figure, the amount of discretion exercised, the
58 See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, Race, Income and Perceptions of the U.S. Court System, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 250, 251-53 (2001); W.S. Wilson
Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, Support and Confidence: Public Attitudes toward the Police, in
AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 31, 32-33
(Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996).
59 Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 53, at 16-17.
60 See, e.g., Joel Brockner et al., High ProceduralFairness Heightens the Effect of Outcome Favorability on Self-Evaluations: An Attributional Analysis, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISIONAL PROCESSES 51, 53-55, 63-66 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Maura A. Belliveau,
Tradeoffs in Justice Principles:Definitions of Fairness, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE 291, 300 (Barbara B. Bunker & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1995).
61 Heuer et al., supra note 53, at 1469, 1474; Psychological Models, supra note 40, at
855, 857.
62 Heuer et al., supra note 53, at 1471-74; PsychologicalModels, supra note 40, at 857.
63 E.g., Brockner et al., supra note 60, at 51-52.
64 See generally Wayte et al., supra 53; Brockner et al., supra note 60.
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manner in which participants became eligible for the process, the method
of calculating compensation, and the limitless nature of the resource distributed. As described above, the Fund differs considerably from alternative compensation schemes, such as the tort system, workers'
compensation, and crime victims' compensation funds, in terms of both
procedure and outcome.
Significantly, this compensation fund was created in response to a
terrorist act for which the compensation authority (the U.S. government)
was perceived by some as culpable. 65 The special master had an unusually high degree of discretion, and he both made final decisions (which
were unappealable, except to himself) and crafted the Fund's regulatory
procedures. 66 In these respects, he was not an authority figure in the
same sense as other dispensers of justice, such as a police officer, legal
fact-finder (e.g., a judge), government official, or work supervisor. The
special master's unique constellation of powers has led some commentators to question the Fund's legitimacy. 6 7 Finally, unlike most studies of
distributive justice, the resource being distributed (i.e., money from the
68
U.S. Treasury) was not scarce or otherwise limited.
Additionally, the results of this study provide important preliminary
information for evaluating the success of the Fund and creating future
victim compensation schemes if policy makers are faced with other terrorist incidents that warrant them. To date, many scholars and writers
have made claims about the purported successes and failures of the Fund.
Feinberg himself, as well as many others, believe that the Fund was administered equitably and that the claimants who wanted to be heard had a
chance to participate and make their views known. 69 Feinberg did in fact
go to extreme lengths to be available to the claimants and their families,
and he has been widely praised for this. 70 Feinberg believed that this
approach was not only appropriate but also accounted for the high rate of
participation by the families. 7 ' He also believed that families were more
likely to accept the statutorily mandated differences in economic loss
72
awards if given the opportunity to be heard.
Critics of the Fund have pointed out that participation is not the only
measure of procedural justice, however. For example, according to Tyler
65 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-

(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/91 I/report/91IReport.pdf; e.g., Tyler
& Thorisdottir, supra note 3, at 359.
PORT

66 See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 7.

67 E.g., Berkowitz, supra note 5.
68 MILLER, supra note 43; Skitka & Tetlock, supra note 46, at 498-16.
69 Ackerman, supra note 2, at 209-11, 227; WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at
163-75.
70 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 218-20.
71 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 163-68.
72 Id. at 93-117.
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and Thorisdottir, acceptance of legal decisions is more likely when people have not only voiced their concerns, but also when they believe that
their input was considered in the final decision. 73 The absence of any
requirement that award decisions be justified, in writing or otherwise,
violated this aspect of procedural justice. 74 Feinberg believed that he had
in fact provided transparency and consistency by publishing presumed
75
awards on the website and explaining the basis of those calculations,
even though families did not have any assurances, beyond Feinberg's
word, that other families in similar circumstances would receive similar
awards. Although it is impossible to determine objectively what would
constitute a "successful" compensation fund because perceptions of justice are related to the public's acceptance of legal authority, 76 it is important to consider the perceptions of the beneficiaries of the Fund in
evaluating the Fund and thinking ahead to the future.
E.

HYPOTHESES

Given the unprecedented nature of the Fund, the research is largely
exploratory. However, previous research on procedural and distributive
justice and the extensive public discourse about the Fund allow us to
make three specific hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (distributive justice): Based on the inequality of the
distribution of compensation and the collateral offset requirement, claim-

ants will not be satisfied with the amount of compensation they received.
Hypothesis 2 (procedural justice): Because of the due process protections instituted by the Special Master, claimants will be moderately
satisfied with the procedures of the Fund.
Hypothesis 3 (correlations): Claimants who received more compensation from the Fund will express a greater sense of procedural and distributive justice and claimants who more strongly believed the process
was fair will express a greater sense of distributive justice.
II.
A.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE

We obtained the names and addresses of the 2,880 death claimants
through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 77 Three hundred
73

Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 3, at 375-82; see also Diller, supra note 28, at

758-65 (criticism of the Fund's procedures).
74

See e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 211-12.

75 WHAT Is Ln'a WORTH, supra

note 3, at 48-49.

See supra Part I.C.2.
77 The participants are limited to those who made a claim to the Fund as the personal
representative (usually next of kin) of a deceased victim of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We did
not send the survey to claimants who were injured on September 11th but survived. There
76
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names were initially selected at random, after which any claimants with
foreign addresses were removed, leaving 292 surveys that were mailed in
June and July 2005.78 Out of the 292 that were mailed, 14 came back as
undeliverable, and 13 came back with forwarding addresses and they
were forwarded. Thus, 278 surveys were presumably received by claimants. Each participant who returned the survey received fifty dollars,
though several declined payment. We sent a second request and replacement survey in September 2005. We ultimately received responses from
seventy-one participants, a 25.5% response rate.
Most of the participants were female (70%) and most (84.1%) were
white. Most claimants were the victim's spouse (46.5%) or parent
(33.8%), although other relationships (e.g., child, sibling) were represented as well. Most (82.9%) of the claimants had filed on behalf of
victims who died in the World Trade Center. Table 1 displays characteristics of the sample and also shows that the sample was fairly representative of the claimant population as a whole. For example, the percentage
of victims who died at the World Trade Center (82.9%) was exactly the
same for all of the claimants to the Fund as it was for the present sample;
victims' mean age in the sample was 40.7, compared to 31-40 for the
79
population.
B.

MATERIALS

Most of the survey questions use a Likert-type scale to ask the participant to choose one response from five possibilities ranging from
"Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." The content of the questions
was developed after reviewing the empirical accounts of the Fund, 80 as
well as the literature on procedural and distributive justice.8 1 The questions were aimed at learning about the participants' perceptions of the
procedural and distributive justice of the Fund and its administration, as
were 2,680 injury claims to the Fund, but they received only $1.05 billion, 15% of the total
Fund distribution. WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 193. These claimants do not share
common issues to the same degree as the death claimants do. For example, future income was
not an issue for those with less severe injuries, but was for the relatively small number of
injury victims with grave injuries. In addition, Feinberg did not set a uniform amount for noneconomic damages for injury victims, so these awards varied; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,
at 43.
78 Financial constraints prevented us from surveying the entire population of claimants to
the Fund.
79 FINAL REPORT, supra note 7 (reporting age data in ranges).
80 DIXON & STERN, supra note 5; FINAL REPORT, supra note 7; WHAT Is LIFE WORTH,

supra note 3.
81 Brockner et al., supra note 60; Heuer et al., supra note 53; Psychological Models,
supra note 40; Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INrr'L J. PSYCHOL.
117 (2000).
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Table 1
Sample Characteristics
Claimant
51.8
71.1
100

Victim
40.7 (31-40)
14.1 (24.0)
93.8 (91.4)

Mean Age
Women
U.S. Citizens
Race/Ethnicity
84.1
85.3
White
11.8
10.1
Black
2.9
1.5
Hispanic
1.5
2.9
Asian
Relationship
46.5
Spouse
33.8
Parent
5.6
Child
4.2
Partner
2.8
Sibling
1.4
Niece/Nephew
2.8
Friend
2.8
Other
Had Dependent Children
50.0 (51.8)
No
42.9 (48.2)
Yes
7.1
Conceived/Unborn
Location During Attack
82.9 (82.9)
World Trade Center
10.0 (5.9)
Airplane
4.3 (3.9)
Pentagon
1.4 (7.2)
Street in NY
1.4
Other
Received Estimate of Award
77.8
31.8 (31.4)
Accepted Estimate w/out Meeting
Had Help from Lawyer
90.1
35.9
Paid Lawyer
Note. Except for age, figures are percentages. N = 71. Figures in parentheses are
characteristics for the full, death-claimant population (FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at
96-108).
well as details of their experience in seeking and receiving compensation
through the Fund.
The survey instrument contained 39 questions, a few with subparts.
The first set of questions requested basic demographic information about
the claimant and victim, where the victim was when s/he was mortally
wounded, how much compensation (in ranges) the claimant received
from the Fund, and whether s/he received compensation from other
sources. The survey also asked a few questions about the claimant's ap-
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proach to the Fund, including whether s/he used a lawyer and whether s/
he met with representatives of the Fund.
Part two of the survey asked claimants to rate their agreement/disagreement (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree)
with a number of statements assessing their perception of various components of procedural (11 items) and distributive justice (6 items). For
example:
I had the opportunity to present everything I wanted
to present to those in charge of determining compensation from the Fund. The representatives of the Fund
treated me with respect and dignity. I participatedto the
extent that I desired in the process that determined the
compensation. My degree of participationin the process
affected the compensation that was provided by the
Fund. The procedures by which the compensation was
determined were fair. From my perspective today, the
people in charge of the Fund were trustworthy. My
claim was resolved within a reasonable amount of time.
I understand the reasons why the Fund awarded the
amount of compensation that it did. I understand how
the amount of compensation was determined. I was satisfied with the compensation provided by the Fund. The
compensationfrom the Fundfor my claim was fair compared to what other families received. [See Table 4 for
additional items.]
At the end of the survey, there were three open-ended questions
where the participants were invited to write about their views of the
Fund, including "Do you think that if events similar to the events of
September 11, 2001 occur again there should be another fund like the
Victim Compensation Fund? Why/why not?".
1H. RESULTS
Some participants did not answer an occasional question; analyses
for each question are based on the number who answered that question.

A.

COMPENSATION

Participants were asked to indicate compensation by checking one
of several possible ranges (see Table 2). Fourteen participants did not
respond to this question. Of those who did respond, there was a broad
range of compensation (see Table 2), with a median of $1.25-1.75 million; 26.3% received more than $2 million. These figures suggest that
the sample participants were reasonably representative of the entire pool
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of claimants, where the median compensation was $1.7 million. Most
participants received compensation from one or more sources besides the
Fund, mainly from insurance (83.1%), charity (77.5%), and workers
compensation (73.2%). Over three-quarters (77.5%) of participants reported that they received less from the Fund because of the collateral
offset doctrine and an additional 16.9% reported that they didn't know
whether their award had been offset or not.
Table 2
Fund Compensation
Range
$250-500,000
$500-750,000
$750,000-1 million
$1-1.25 million
$1.25-1.75 million
$1.75-2 million
$2-4 million
> $4 million

% of Claimants
8.8
8.8
10.5
21.1
15.8
8.8
22.8
3.5

Note. N = 57.

B.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE FUND

In this section we present selected findings of participants' perceptions of the Fund and the processes of filing a claim and receiving an
award to test our hypotheses regarding overall perceptions of procedural
and distributive justice. 82 To convey the degree of variability in responses, we present the percentage of respondents who agreed (combining "strongly agree" and "agree"), disagreed (combining "strongly
disagree" and "disagree"), or were neutral on each statement.
1. Distributive Justice
Table 3 shows the results for selected items related to perceptions of
distributive justice. Overall, these figures indicate considerable dissatisfaction with the amount of compensation. Although 63.5% of participants expected fair compensation before filing, only 31.9% agreed that
they received fair compensation after filing, and only 15.6% felt that
they received fair compensation compared to other families. Consistent
with this latter figure, nearly two-thirds of participants (64.3%) agreed
that the Fund administrators placed different values on people's lives.
Therefore, there was some amount of perceived injustice in terms of both
82 For purposes of correlational analysis, we also created indices of procedural and distributive justice, as described in Part UI.B.3, infra.
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absolute and relative compensation, although participants were more satisfied with their absolute compensation (31.9% agreed that it was fair)
than with their relative compensation (15.6% agreed that it was fair).
The collateral offset rule was one of the most controversial elements of
the Fund in public discourse about the Fund. Not surprisingly, 78.5% of
participants viewed this rule as unfair.
Table 3
Perceptions of Distributive Justice
Item
Before filing, I expected the
Fund would provide fair
compensation.
The compensation provided by
the Fund was fair.
My compensation was fair
compared to what other families
received.
The rule that certain money be
deducted from the amount of
compensation was fair.
The fact that I received a
different amount from other
claimants shows they place
different values on lives.

Agree (%) Neutral (%) Disagree (%)
63.5
19.0
17.4
31.9

23.2

44.9

15.6

40.6

43.8

11.5

10.0

78.5

64.3

14.3

21.5

Note. Numbers may not equal 100% exactly due to rounding. "Agree" percentages
combine "strongly agree" and "agree" responses, and "disagree" percentages combine
"strongly disagree" and "disagree" responses.

2.

ProceduralJustice

Table 4 shows the results for selected items related to perceptions of
procedural justice. Compared to their perception of the claim's outcome,
participants were more satisfied with the process, especially in terms of
their degree of participation (76.8% agreed that they participated to the
extent desired and 59.1% understood how the amount of compensation
was determined) and their interactions with Fund representatives (85.5%
felt they were treated respectfully). Nonetheless, there is clear evidence
of dissatisfaction with the procedures. Although 62% expected the process to be fair before filing, only 23.2% found the procedures to be fair
after filing. On the latter question, nearly half of the participants
(49.2%) disagreed that the procedures had been fair, and only 43.3%
found the Fund representatives impartial. These data indicate that the
Special Master was in a sense successful in his efforts to make the process open, especially on an interpersonal level, but nevertheless leaving
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many claimants dissatisfied and with an incomplete understanding of
how their compensation had been determined.
Table 4
Perceptions of ProceduralJustice
Item

Agree (%) Neutral (%) Disagree (%)

Before filing, I expected the
process to be fair.

62.0

19.7

18.3

Fund representatives treated me
with respect and dignity.

85.5

11.6

2.8

I participated to the extent that I
desired.

76.8

11.6

11.5

The procedures by which
compensation was determined
were fair.

23.2

27.5

49.2

People who determined
compensation were impartial.

43.3

28.4

28.4

I understand how the amount of
compensation was determined.

59.1

14.1

26.7

Note. Numbers may not equal 100% exactly due to rounding. "Agree" percentages
combine "strongly agree" and "agree" responses, and "disagree" percentages combine
"strongly disagree" and "disagree" responses.

3. Relationships Among ProceduralJustice, Distributive Justice,
and Compensation
Responses to the survey were used to assess correlations among perceptions of procedural justice, distributive justice, and compensation.
Agree/disagree responses were scored on a five-point scale, and the
eleven procedural justice items and the six distributive justice items were
averaged to create scales. 83 Table 5 contains the items comprising each
scale. Participants who did not respond to some of the items were not
included in these analyses.

83 Responses were scored so that 1 = strongly agree, 3 = neutral, and 5 = strongly disagree. The procedural justice and distributive justice scales were both highly reliable, with a
.88 and .82, respectively.
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Table 5
Items Comprising Proceduraland Distributive Justice Scales
ProceduralJustice (11 items; c = .88)
I had the opportunity to present everything I wanted to present.
Representatives of the Fund treated me with respect and dignity.
I participated to the extent that I desired in the process.
The procedures by which the compensation was determined were fair.
The people who determined the compensation were impartial.
The people in charge of the Fund were trustworthy.
My claim was resolved within a reasonable amount of time.
I understand why the Fund awarded the amount of compensation that it did.
I understand how the amount of compensation was determined.
The information that I needed to submit to request compensation was easy to
obtain.
The forms that I needed to fill out were easy to understand.
Distributive Justice (6 items; a = .82)
The compensation provided by the Fund was fair.
I was satisfied with the compensation provided by the Fund.
The compensation for my claim was fair compared to what other families
received.
The rule that certain money, such as life insurance, be deducted or offset was
fair.
The fact that I received a different amount than others shows they placed different values on lives.*
I felt that I was competing with other families/claimants for a large compensation award.*
*These items were negatively correlated with the other distributive justice items and were
reverse-scored for purposes of analysis.
The responses correlated as predicted, and the correlation between
84
perceptions of procedural and distributive justice was especially high.
The more compensation participants received, the more satisfied they
were with both the procedural and distributive aspects of the Fund, al85
though the former correlation was only marginally significant.
To explore whether participants' perceptions and compensation differed depending on their demographic characteristics, we performed a
series of analyses on these same three measures, grouped by participant
gender, race (white vs. non-white), and relationship to the decedent
(spouse/partner vs. parent vs. other). Participant gender was not associated with significant differences on perceived procedural justice, distrib84 r =.72, p <.001.
85 r = -.26, p < .08, and r = .43, p < .01, respectively.
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utive justice, or compensation. 86 Race was also not associated with
participants' perception of procedural or distributive justice, 87 but white
88
participants received marginally greater compensation.
We categorized participants' relationship to the victim as "spouse/
partner," "parent," or "other," which combined several low-frequency
categories (e.g., child, sibling, friend). Participants' relationship to the
decedent influenced their perception of both procedural and distributive
justice. 89 Spouse/partners perceived significantly less procedural fairness than others, 90 as well as less distributive fairness. 9 1 Parents were
intermediate on both measures and did not significantly differ from either
of the other two groups. The relationship groups did not differ in terms
92
of their compensation.
4. Responses to Open-Ended Questions
Participants' opinions about the existence of the Fund itself were
generally, though not unanimously, supportive. Two-thirds (66.2%) of
participants believed that if similar events occurred again in the future,
there should be another Fund like the Victim Compensation Fund, but
26.2% responded that such a Fund should not be employed. 93 Nearly
three-quarters, or 72.9%, of participants wrote something in response to
at least one of the open-ended questions. Consistent with the results
presented above, many participants complained about the collateral offset rule. For example, one participant stated, "I don't think it was fair to
take personal life insurance money away from award [sic]. That had
nothing to do with the government's money" (Participant #6). With respect to money distribution, several participants complained that inequality was inherently unfair. Sentiments such as "All life is important-one
amount for all is fair-no one should determine another person's value!"
(Participant #22) and "I don't think one life is worth more than another"
(Participant #6) were common. Participants' comments also reflected
their relatively high level of satisfaction with the Fund's personnel and
procedures, stating, for example, "The people in charge of the fund were
very sensitive to our difficult situation. A special thank you to Mr.
Respectively, t(55) = .28, t(59) = 1.26, and t(54) = .19; ps > .2.
t(56) = .58 and t(60) = 1.09, respectively; ps > .2.
t(55) = 1.79, p = .08.
Respectively, F(2,55) = 3.12, p = .05, and F(2,59) = 3.32, p < .05.
Means were 2.78 for spouse/partners and 2.17 for others, p < .05; higher values indicate less agreement with statements about fair treatment.
91 Means = 3.66 vs. 2.94, p < .05; higher values indicate less agreement with statements
86
87
88
89
90

about fair treatment.
92 F(2,54) = 1.34, p > .2.
93 An additional 7.7% wrote in that they were "unsure."
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Feinbaum [sic] and his staff' (Participant #25) and "I met with Mr. Feinberg and felt he was honorable and did a great job" (Participant #2).
C.

LIMITATIONS

The principal limitation of the present study is that it sampled only
71 participants from a population of 2880 individuals. These 71 individuals might be representative of neither the 279 persons contacted, nor of
the larger population. Future research should attempt to procure a larger
sample to address these concerns. However, the size of the present sample should not cause great concern, for two reasons. First, the main risk
of non-response error is that individuals who respond will differ systematically from non-respondents. 94 For example, this would be the case if
only those who were dissatisfied with the Fund responded, or conversely,
if mostly satisfied claimants responded. Although we cannot rule out
this possibility, the range of responses suggests that we were not sampling from just one end of the distribution.
Second, the present sample compares favorably to the available descriptive data on the entire class of participants.9 5 For example, the median award made by the Fund was $1.7 million; the median award in the
present sample was in the $1.25-$1.75 million category, which is approximately the same. The sample was also reasonably representative of the
entire population in terms of age, sex, dependent children, location at
time of death, etc. (see Table 1). A larger sample would permit confirmation of the present findings, while allowing for finer-grained analyses of
claimants' experiences with the Fund as a function of their race/ethnicity,
citizenship, and so forth. We hope that the present study provides a useful starting point for future empirical study of the Fund.
IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

Overall, these findings offer support for our research hypotheses.
Participants were more satisfied with procedural than distributive aspects
of the Fund and perceptions of justice were correlated with the amount of
compensation participants received from the Fund. With respect to procedural justice, Mr. Feinberg appears to have been relatively-though
not completely-successful in his attempts to provide claimants with elements of due process such as voice and neutrality. With respect to distributive justice, participants were less satisfied, especially with the
94 DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD 11

(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2000).
95 See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 52-55; WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra

note 3, at 192-204.

Bornstein & Poser in Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy (2007) v. 17, p. 75-99.
Copyright 2007, Cornell University Law School. Used by permission.

96

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17:75

collateral offset rule, and notions of relative fairness were paramount in
claimants' minds. Only 15.6% of participants felt that their compensation
was fair compared to what other families received and nearly two-thirds
of participants (64.3%) believed that the Fund administrators placed different values on people's lives. These figures support Mr. Feinberg's
own conclusion, after the Fund closed, that all eligible claimants in future cases should receive the same amount of compensation. 96
There were relatively few differences across various demographic
groups, which may be a function of the sample size, especially in terms
of different racial/ethnic groups. Nonetheless, some differences did
emerge. Whites and non-whites did not differ in terms of perceived justice, but non-whites received marginally less compensation. Whether
this merely reflects differential earning capacity among the victims (who
were, in nearly all instances, the same race as the claimants) or a more
insidious bias, the present data cannot address. The most consistent difference occurred when claimants were classified by their relationship to
the victim, with spouses perceiving significantly less procedural and distributive justice than "others" (e.g., child, sibling). Parent claimants did
not differ significantly from either group, but were more akin to spouses.
This pattern of findings likely reflects the more pronounced feeling of
incommensurability when one loses a spouse or child, compared to the
loss of other family members.
As predicted, perceptions of procedural and distributive justice and
the amount of compensation were correlated. These findings support
previous research showing that although individuals distinguish between
process and outcome, there is overlap between these elements of justice. 97 Similarly, actual outcomes are related to their perceived fairness,
98
in both an absolute and a relative sense.
B.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The circumstances of the Fund were different from the contexts in
which distributive and procedural justice have typically been studied. 99
For example, Congress created the Fund in response to a terrorist act for
which some perceived the compensation authority, the United States
government, to be culpable; 1°° the Special Master had an unusually high
96 See generally WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 177-88.
97 See supra Part I.C.3.
98 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 43; Sunshine & Heuer, supra note 49; Psychological
Models, supra note 40.
99 See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 3, at 372-75, 382-86.
100 See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 65
(discussing missed opportunities in developing effective counterterrorism procedures prior to
the attacks, and changes that should be made in governmental organization to deal with a new
age of terrorism).
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degree of discretion over final distribution of the funds; l0 1 and the pool
of money for distribution was not limited, at least not in any meaningful
way. 10 2 The Special Master also differed from other authority figures
who dispense justice, such as a police officer, a judge, or a work supervisor, in that his decisions did not directly affect claimants' future liberty,
employment status, or opportunities. Despite these differences, the demonstration that the same sorts of relational and resource concerns are important in the context of the September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund
as in other situations where social justice has been studied lends convergent validity to theories of justice.
C.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The most direct implication of this research is to contribute to the
national conversation about the government's responsibility to victims of
terrorism. As government officials have stated repeatedly, it is not a
question of "if' the United States will experience another terrorist attack
but a question of "when" and "how." 10 3 It is noteworthy that although
two-thirds (66.2%) of Fund participants supported a similar compensation scheme for similar future events, more than a quarter of participants
(26.2%) felt that such a Fund should not be employed again. The Special
Master himself favored changes, such as awarding all claimants a flat
amount.'°4 However, debate about the merits of the Fund goes beyond
the government's response to terrorism. For example, some activists and
commentators invoked the Fund's procedural and distributive issues in
assessing the government's response in 2005 to the natural disasters of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 10 5 This research is applicable in the private
context as well, as in the distribution of donated funds to compensate
victims of the 2007 Virginia Tech shootings.10 6 Thus, when the culpable
party-whether a foreign terrorist, Mother Nature, or a criminal-cannot
be compelled to compensate its victims, it appears that governmental and
non-governmental plans to do so are here to stay. Empirical data on the
results of such plans and informed debate about the features they should
take are critical to structuring future compensation mechanisms and gaining the public's acceptance.
101 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 404, 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2001) (giving broad administration powers to the Special Master); Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra
note 3, at 384.
102 Id. at 382 ("[N]either legislators nor victims were able to look to prior situations to
make an initial determination of how much compensation was appropriate.").
103 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 65, at 361-65.
104 WHAT Is LIFE WORTH, supra note 3, at 177-88.
105 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Robert L. Rabin, September 11 Through
the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 483 (2006); Holly Yeager, Victims'
Groups Seek a Voice in Reconstruction, FIN. TimEs (London), Sept. 20, 2005, at 17.
106 Urbina, supra note 9.
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Lawyers and legal academics have begun to consider the relevance
of the Fund to the tort reform movement, 0 7 particularly as it relates to
the debate about caps on non-economic damages and the collateral
source rule, which ordinarily prevents juries from adjusting awards based
on other compensatory payments, such as life and health insurance, received by the victim. 108 In addition, exploration of the willingness of
claimants to eschew the traditional tort remedy for an alternative, nofault payment scheme may provide important insights into reform of the
civil justice system, a system primarily based on fault.' 0 9 The data show
that claimants to the Fund were willing to forego the possibility of higher
damages for guaranteed payments with minimal transaction costs. Moreover, insights into social justice gleaned from the Fund could have important ramifications for distributive programs in general, including
crime-victim compensation, social welfare, unemployment insurance,
and reparations. 10
Finally, the present results could also lead to further research on
administrative discretion. The Special Master, who had tremendous discretion and whose decisions were final, 1 1' put in place many procedural
safeguards but left out others, such as a provision requiring justification
of his final decisions. 12 The data provide us with important information
about the degree to which people are willing to accept the exercise of
discretion as legitimate, as long as it is coupled with particular procedural safeguards.
CONCLUSION
In considering the government's role in compensating people for
losses due to terrorism, there is much to learn from the September 11 th
Victim Compensation Fund. These data about the role that perceptions
of procedural and distributive justice played in claimants' satisfaction
with the Fund support the findings of previous studies that link these
justice issues to overall satisfaction with other encounters with govern107 See, e.g., Christopher P. DePhillips & Brian P. Sharkey, Will Tort Reform Be the
Legacy of the September lth Victim Compensation Fund? 173 N.J. L. J. 876, 880 (2003);
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 1337-45.
108 Mullenix, supra note 2, at 1337-45.
109 Id. at 1341-45.
110 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 28 (discussing the links between the Fund and several
principles of social welfare); James L. Gibson, Addressing HistoricalInjustice, 17 Soc. JUST.
REs. 421 (2004) (discussing the need for more empirical data on justice claims to add to the
dialogue on social justice, generally and with regard to reparations).
111 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 405(b)(3), 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2001).
112 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 15-18, 64-65 (discussing the process for evaluating claims and the need for transparency in the process, but lacking a provision for the justification of individual compensation determinations).
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mental and nongovernmental authorities. 11 3 Although claimants' satis-

faction is not the sole measure of a compensation scheme's success, it is
nonetheless important because it affects the willingness of participants to
accept what they might consider suboptimal decisions. By this measure,
the Fund did fairly well in some respects (especially the Fund's procedures), but not as well in other respects (especially the ultimate distribution and the rules related to determining that amount, such as the
collateral offset rule). Finally, this study contributes important empirical
data to the national conversation about the propriety and attributes of
future funds, should the government contemplate creating a compensatory mechanism in the event of another terrorist attack or national
disaster.

113 See supra Part I.C.

